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Introduction
As a small, open economy, trade is crucial for the Belgian economy. With
increasing economic interdependence and the expanding scope of the trade
agenda over the past two decades, trade policy has become even more impor-
tant. Nonetheless, there is barely any research on Belgium’s role in interna-
tional trade policy. Perhaps this is because Belgium has no direct control over
its trade policy, as this has been a supranational European Union (EU;
formerly European Community, EC) competence since the Treaties of Rome
(1957). However, Belgium does have a role to play in this EU trade policy,
most importantly through its participation in the Council of Ministers of the
EU (hereafter: the Council). For example, mandates need to be approved by
the Council before the European Commission (hereafter: the Commission)
can start negotiating free trade agreements (FTAs), ongoing negotiations are
being monitored by Member States’ representatives in the Trade Policy
Committee (TPC), and final agreements need to be approved by the Council,
the European Parliament and sometimes still by the Member States’ Parlia-
1 Yelter Bollen is a PhD researcher. He is studying the formation of Member States’ policy preferences in
trade. Marjolein Derous is a PhD Researcher and Teaching Assistant. Her research focuses on the
bilateral relations between the EU and countries of Southeast Asia. Ferdi De Ville is an assistant
professor. His research focuses mainly on EU trade policy. Niels Gheyle is PhD researcher. His
research is about the causes and consequences of the politicization of TTIP. Jan Orbie is the Director of
the Centre for EU Studies and a Full Professor. His research focuses on EU external policies. Lore
Van den Putte is a PhD researcher funded by the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO). Her main
research interest lies in the linkage between labour norms and EU bilateral trade agreements. All
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ments2. There are also a number of Council advisory committees, such as on
trade defence measures, in which the Belgian government is represented.
Trade policy legislation – e.g. regulations on anti-dumping or preferential
systems for developing countries – also need approval by the Council. Indi-
rectly, Belgium is involved in trade policy-making through its Members of the
European Parliament (MEPs) that has become a co-legislator in trade policy
since the Treaty of Lisbon (2009).
This article aims to provide an overview of Belgium’s position in EU trade
policy. We focus on the (offensive and defensive) positions promoted by
Belgium in the context of European trade policy-making3. This mostly involves
the negotiations on trade and (more and more) trade-related issues through
multilateral and (increasingly) bilateral agreements. It also involves trade
defence measures such as anti-dumping, which serve to protect the domestic
economy against unfair competition from outside the EU. As will become
clear, while being the responsibility of the federal government, the creation of a
Belgian position also involves the regional (sub-national) level.
The next section will summarize the general lines of Belgium’s position in
EU trade policy. It will be argued that the Belgian position has displayed a
surprising continuity over the previous decades, namely supporting the
Commission’s free trade line while defending some very specific sensitivities.
Next, we will analyse to what extent this also applies to a recent and most
contested case, namely the negotiations on the EU-US Trans-Atlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Based on this analysis as well as illustra-
tive examples from other cases (e.g. EU-Korea, EU-Colombia/Peru and EU-
Canada), we will provide two strands of explanations for the Belgian position.
A number of institutional variables direct our focus to the fragmented decision-
making system of this federal country and the ‘Grand Coalition’ character of
most Belgian governments. A number of interest-based variables bring our
2 While most sectors covered in EU trade agreements belong to the exclusive supranational competence of
the Common Commercial Policy since the Treaty of Lisbon, some legal discussion remains over specific
issues, such as the precise scope of foreign direct investment. Consequently, while the FTA between the
EU and South Korea had been concluded after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, it has been
defined as a mixed agreement, requiring ratification of the Member States. It is also expected that TTIP,
if the negotiations are successfully concluded, would be considered a mixed agreement (see infra).
3 In the Belgian Federation, since the state reform of 2001 (also known as the ‘Lambermont Agree-
ments’), the Regions have become constitutionally responsible for trade policy. However, an important
exception is made for multilateral co-operation (i.e. participation in EU trade policy-making) that
remains the competence of the federal government. In practice, this means that the Regions are respon-
sible for (and invest considerable resources in) export promotion activities, while the federal level
assumes the coordination role to prepare Belgian positions. vis-à-vis EU trade policy.
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attention to the material economic base of the Belgian economy as well as the
position of business and civil society groups. We conclude by positing the
hypothesis that the recent politicization of EU trade politics renders the tradi-
tional consensual Belgian position unsustainable.
Belgium’s historical position: continuities
There are various avenues for the Belgian governments to be involved in differ-
ent EU trade policy-making dimensions, making it difficult to identify the
Belgian position. To characterize the position of a Member States in this
domain, it has been customary in the literature on EU trade policy to divide
Member States’ positions into a ‘liberal North’ versus ‘protectionist Club Med’
camp (e.g. Elsig 2002). While this has been called too simplistic by one partic-
ipant in EU trade policy (Baldwin 2006: 931), a long-standing member of the
‘Article 133 committee’ (the predecessor of the Trade Policy Committee or
TPC) has called it ‘a convenient shorthand’ (Johnson 1998: 39). When assess-
ing the Belgian position, it is hence useful to start by asking where Belgium
stands on this divide. In trade policy circles it is often said that the dividing
line between protectionists and liberals coincides with the linguistic frontier
within Belgium. In this sense the position achieved by the Belgian policy-
makers would reflect a ‘mini’ version of the consensus reached at EU level.
While this image certainly carries some truth, in the remainder of this article
we aim to analyse it with more rigour.
A number of striking continuities can be discerned in Belgium’s trade policy
positions over the past two to three decades. First, Belgium has often and
consistently been recognized as one of the most supranationalist or integration-
ist EU Member States when it comes to trade policy. Although trade has been
an exclusive EU competence since the Rome Treaties, there have been several
fierce debates on how wide the notion of ‘trade’ should be interpreted (e.g. if it
should also include trade-related services and investment measures). When
negotiating Treaty revisions or dealing with disputes at the European Court of
Justice (ECJ), Belgium has often sided with the integrationist position of the
European Commission. For example, when in the aftermath of the World
Trade Organisation’s (WTO) Uruguay Round, the European Commission and
the Member States disagreed about the scope of the supranational EU trade
policy competences resulting in two landmark cases before the European Court
of Justice (Opinions 1/94 and 2/92), Belgium was the only Member State that
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completely and vocally supported the Commission’s position (i.e. comprehen-
sive interpretation of EU trade policy competences) (Young 2000: 108).
Second, but related to the previous point, is that Belgium’s substantive
position has generally been close to the preferences of the European Commis-
sion. The latter tends to balance between protectionist and liberalization trends
in Europe, although it is clearly more supportive of liberalization-oriented poli-
cies. This supporting liberalization with some reservations position of Belgium
includes:
 Agriculture: Particular attention for the specific interests of the agricul-
tural sector, despite a tendency to favour the liberal group within the
EU when it comes to free trade in agricultural products. It is recognized
that the ‘multi-functionality’ of agriculture should be respected in inter-
national trade, although for several products the liberalization of import
tariffs and suppression of export subsidies is generally favoured.
Belgium is also supportive of the promotion of geographical indications.
 Services: Generally in favour of the liberalization of trade-related
services, although a more defensive position is taken in regards to non-
commercial (public) services
 Development: Belgium has generally favoured a preferential treatment
for the former colonial countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the
Pacific (ACP group) through the subsequent Lomé/Cotonou Conven-
tions, although it has also gradually accepted that this trade relationship
should be restructured and made compatible with the rules of the WTO
Third, there are a number of particular points of attention. Belgium has been
particularly vigilant when it comes to trade negotiations on public services such
as education, public health and social services (FOD Buitenlandse Zaken,
n.d.). It has also been one of the strongest opponents of the liberalization of
audiovisual services, favouring an exception culturelle in this area. Moreover,
Belgium has consistently favoured the promotion of social standards through
international trade agreements.
Belgium’s current position: TTIP et al.
The EU’s trade policy agenda has changed significantly in recent years, aiming
for a more offensive and bilateral agenda. In 2006 the European Commission
moved the main direction of its trade policy from a focus on an agreement at
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the multilateral level in the WTO supplemented with unilateral initiatives
aimed at developing countries, to proactively seeking bilateral FTAs. Since
then the Commission has concluded free trade negotiations with Korea, Central
America, Colombia and Peru, Canada and Singapore. Furthermore, negotia-
tions were recently finalised with Vietnam (December 2015), and are ongoing
with Japan, several countries in Southeast Asia, and most importantly the US.
The negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP) were launched in the summer of 2013 and spurred a previously unseen
(and some might say unforeseeable) public reaction. In several Member States
(especially Germany, Austria and the UK) this public outcry now reaches
national media on a weekly basis and confronts national (and European)
policy officials with questions about the content of the negotiating documents,
the (uncertain and difficult to predict) consequences of an agreement, and the
very legitimacy of trade policy-making in the EU itself.
This leads us to two questions: has the growing politicization of trade
policy (in particular on TTIP) affected the Belgian trade policy debate? And
has this had an impact on Belgium’s general position in EU trade policy
matters?
The answer to the first question is quite straightforward: the widespread
debate on TTIP has gradually seeped into Belgian politics as well, as (federal)
members of Parliament increasingly interrogate the Minister for Foreign
Affairs on a regular basis with oral or written questions (in plenary and the
Foreign Relations Committee). To get a snapshot of this phenomenon, we
analysed federal parliamentary activity and counted the amount of “interven-
tions” by MPs. Interventions include parliamentary questions (oral and writ-
ten) and resolutions, in both chambers, in the period 2012 to July 2015. We
contrast activity on TTIP with three other related European trade issues after
2006: the Anti-Counterfeiting Agreement (ACTA, struck down in the Euro-
pean Parliament in 2012), the free trade agreement with Canada (CETA, rati-
fication phase) and the plurilateral free trade agreement in services (TiSA,
under negotiation).
For ACTA, there has been one resolution and 4 questions, exactly the
same as for CETA. TiSA has been discussed the least, with only 1 resolution
and 1 question. If we compare this with TTIP, the contrast becomes clear:
since the start of the negotiations in 2013 we have encountered 9 resolutions
and 39 questions. The widespread concern in several Member States has
impacted public opinion in Belgium as well, which has spurred MPs to debate
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trade issues that were previously rather uncontested, or at least not politicized.
Although it remains to be seen if this current spike of attention for trade deals
will continue in the future, it is nevertheless a remarkable contrast compared to
the last 10 years. 70% of interventions are furthermore made by centre-left
parties, with Ecolo-Groen (the green party) and the PS (the Walloon socialist
party) as the most active parties (and opponents). The centre-right is practi-
cally silent, although the N-VA (the Flemish nationalist party) also accounts
for 12% of activity. While the earlier Economic Partnership Agreements and
the failed attempt to launch a new WTO Round in Seattle in 1999 amidst
growing anti-globalisation sentiment also attracted broader attention for EU
trade politics, the recent debate surrounding TTIP is unprecedented. At the
regional level, all Parliaments in Belgium have held hearings on TTIP and
discussed a resolution outlining their position. At the time of making the final
revisions to this article, the Walloon Parliament voted a resolution asking its
Government not to give the authority to the Federal Government to sign
CETA. This resolution is clearly a spill-over of the politicization of TTIP and
will also put to a test the Belgian Federal system in trade policy (see infra).
As for the second question, it seems that the Belgian position has remained
remarkably consistent. We see the Belgian position again mirroring the
(liberal) view of the Commission, yet with special attention to some specific
issues4. With respect to offensive interests, we notice market access for
(Belgian) SMEs, in particular, as an important point, which is hoped to be
given a boost by TTIP through general tariff reductions, but especially through
the elimination of non-tariff barriers, which are seen as specifically burden-
some for small companies (2013b)5. Furthermore, the opening of foreign
markets for government procurement is an important interest, especially in
sectors like dredging, construction or public transport where Belgium has
comparative advantages (2015g). The Belgian position also systematically calls
for social and environmental standards within an ambitious sustainable devel-
opment chapter (2013a; 2013c).
Regarding defensive interests, Belgium stresses the importance of public
health care services and argues to not go any further than the commitments
4 The statements that follow are based on the answers by Didier Reynders (Foreign Affairs), Maggie De
Block (Social Affairs) and Willy Borsus (Agriculture – SMEs) on (oral and written) parliamentary
questions. We refer consistently with e.g. (2013a). See reference list under “De Kamer (2013-2015j)”
for all sources.
5 This should be achieved without any lowering of current standards and regulations, and should, in
particular, focus on coordinating new regulations (in the future).
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that were made in the framework of the GATS 1994 (trade in services; 2015c).
Minister De Block also regularly reiterated the statement by EU Trade
Commissioner Malmström (and her American counterpart) that public services
are not on the table, although the Minister acknowledged that it is impossible
to entirely exclude the commercial side of these activities (2015c). Another
point where Belgium is standing its ground is the exception for audiovisual
services, which has been part of the Belgian position for over 20 years (2013c).
The confirmation that this sector would be kept out of the negotiations (until
decided otherwise) marked the official start of negotiations (Kirk, 2013). Agri-
culture is always a contentious issue in the European Union, and Belgium has
its concerns as well. It rejects any concessions related to the EU’s precaution-
ary principle, and supports the Commission’s stance on GMO’s (2015i) – in
defence of the ‘European way of producing’ (2015f; 2015j). Although Belgium
has made less use of geographical indications than other European countries (it
has only 9 registered wines and spirits, and 19 other indications (bread, meat,
fruit…)), it again sides with the Commission in its defence of this protective
system (2015b).
Finally, Belgium has defended the EU’s conduct regarding the alleged opac-
ity of the TTIP talks. Echoing the Commission’s position, it claims the negoti-
ations have been the most transparent ever, with numerous documents online
and ample opportunities to provide input (2015d). Minister Reynders said that
leakage of negotiating documents was regrettable and did not facilitate the
already difficult task of the negotiators, although he acknowledged that docu-
ments should eventually be published (2013a; 2013c).
In sum, Belgium is generally in line with the Commission on TTIP, argu-
ing for an ambitious agreement with some specific sensitive points such as agri-
culture or the cultural exception. Remarkably, this has even been the case with
the most contentious issue in TTIP so far: the investor-to-state-dispute settle-
ment (ISDS) mechanism6. Changes in the Belgian position on this topic have
mirrored changes in the Commission’s stance. For example, like most Member
States it did not initially protest against the inclusion of an ISDS clause in
CETA (or in the first resolution on TTIP). Indeed, Minister Reynders in
6 ISDS is a mechanism that can be included in investment agreements to allow international investors to
sue governments before a special investment tribunal when they argue that a government has breached
its investment protection commitments. This mechanism has recently become controversial because
skeptics fear that this hands illegitimate special rights to multinationals and might lead governments to
restrain from regulating in the public interest (“regulatory chill”). Especially some procedural character-
istics of ISDS like the fact that a tribunal can be composed of private investment lawyers leading to
conflicts of interest and that there is no appeal mechanism have been the subject of heavy criticism.
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2011 argued that Belgium principally backed the initiative of the Commission
to include the settlement mechanism (2011)7. But when public pressure8 forced
the Commission to back away from its univocal support of the clause, Belgium
was quick to follow. When asked about ISDS in October 2014, Reynders said
he was receptive to the concerns of citizens (2014b). In May 2015, Commis-
sioner Malmström’s team drafted changes to the existing ISDS clause and
Belgium simultaneously changed its position to being favourable of the
proposed changes (2015i)9. Currently, Belgium sides with a majority of
Member States and the Commission that want to find a balance between the
protection of investors and the (current and future) right to regulate (2015d).
The idea proposed by the Commission (in the same concept paper on ISDS
reform) to construct a permanent multilateral Investment Court met with
Belgian support as well (2015i).
Minister Reynders acknowledged that TTIP will probably be a mixed
agreement (notwithstanding changes to the Lisbon Treaty that were meant to
make an end to this cumbersome practice; see footnote 1), meaning that all 6
Parliaments in Belgium will have to ratify the agreement (2015a). While in the
past this was unproblematic as EU trade policy was hardly scrutinized (let
alone politicized), TTIP might be different.
In Wallonia and the Brussels capital-region the opposition has been more
vocal and outspoken than in Flanders. While the latter is traditionally more
liberal and export-oriented, Wallonia has less to gain from liberalization and
has more intense defensive preferences in areas such as audio-visual and public
services, which has helped spur the growth of a more potent anti-TTIP/CETA
campaign. A quick search through media databases10 furthermore shows that
the 4 Belgian newspapers covering TTIP most intensively are from the
French-speaking community11. It can also be seen in the phenomenon of
TTIP-free zones12: at the time of writing, in the Brussels capital-region 11 of
the 19 communities have declared themselves TTIP-free (Hope, 2015), while
7 He mentioned that Belgian business sees benefit in this clause, that it’s not wise to exclude it in CETA
when the EU has it with other partners, and that it’s important to have the same level of protection
through EU agreements, like Belgium had under the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU).
8 The Commission had to abandon talks on ISDS temporarily early 2014 and decided to hold a public
consultation on the clause, which prompted a record-high of nearly 150.000 responses.
9 This would include an appellate mechanism, inscribing the right to regulate, and changes to the relation-
ship between ISDS and domestic courts and the way the tribunals work.
10 Using online media database GoPress.
11 L’Avenir, Le Soir, La Libre Belgique and Sud Presse.
12 This refers to local governments that adopt a symbolic resolution opposing the TTIP negotiations and
declaring themselves ‘TTIP-free’. For an overview of local governments having done so, see https://
www.ttip-free-zones.eu.
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over 50 towns have made this symbolic gesture in Wallonia (Schneider, 2015);
the practice remains practically unknown in Flanders13. In response to these
pressures, in April 2015 the Walloon Parliament adopted a resolution calling
for a halt to the negotiations (L’Avenir, 2015).
Explaining the Belgian position
The above analysis has shown the remarkable consistency of the Belgian posi-
tion on EU trade policy over the past decades. Even during the highly
contested TTIP negotiations, Belgium has held on to a position that supports
free trade in principle while calling for the defence of some specific sectors and
norms. This final section aims to explain this Belgian position. Different expla-
nations are clustered around material interests, lobby group pressure and insti-
tutional factors.
Economic interests
Economic interests are an important determinant of countries’ international
trade politics (cfr. Dür, 2008). Moreover, underlying material interests in EU
policy-making can help explain why a country’s position remains relatively
stable despite shifting political parties in government (Alons, 2010). Consider-
ing several economic indicators makes it clear why in Belgium the balance of
power on trade issues has been tilted towards pro-trade groups.
Bernard et al. (in Sleuwaegen & Peeters, 2012) describe Belgium as a
‘middleman’ in trade: heavily dependent on imported inputs for its own produc-
tion and exports. In part, this is due to the extensive activity of multinational
corporations. Although only a very small amount of firms operating in Belgium
are multinational companies, these account not only for the bulk of Belgian
trade (exports and imports), but also produce nearly half of all value added and
employ (in 2005) 36% of private sector workers (Dhyne & Duprez, 2011).
Secondly, this ‘middleman’ status is also due to the increasing dependency of
Belgian firms on foreign intermediates (Sleuwaegen & Peeters, 2012).
Compared to the EU average, Belgium is somewhat more integrated (in value
added terms) internationally, and more so with non-EU countries than the EU
13 Ghent was the first city where reigning majority (progressive) parties have come out against TTIP and
were campaigning for a TTIP-free zone. However, in September 2015, the City Council decided to drop
this (symbolic) wording and advocated a “smart-TTIP”.
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average. About 16% of all value added embedded in Belgian exports is from a
non-EU source14. This is an indication of the extent to which Belgian compet-
itiveness is dependent on the price and quality of imports. Because of this,
trade policy measures like tariffs and anti-dumping measures can actually harm
the industries they’re designed to protect (Ahmad, 2013; IMF, 2013; Timmer,
Los, Stehrer, & de Vries, 2013)met problemen (iets moeilijker bekijk nog eens.
Furthermore, the Belgian economy has become more dependent on (Belgian
and EU) exports to non-EU markets. In 2011 about 17% of all employment in
Belgium was supported by EU exports to non-EU countries, some 2.5 percent-
age points above the European average, up from 10% in 1995. Three quarters
of these jobs were in services, only 23% was in manufacturing, and 30% (twice
the European average) was linked to EU trade with the US. Total value added
‘generated in Belgium by EU exports to the rest of the world’ has increased by
180% since 1995, and this export-dependent share in value added has increased
from 11% to 18% in 2011 (Arto, Rueda-cantuche, Amores, & Dietzenbacher,
2015). There are indications that this trend has not yet peaked: a majority of
Flemish SMEs, for example, is hoping to increase its exports in the coming
years (Flanders Investment & Trade, 2014).
Of course, a substantial amount of economic activity is still mostly domestic
and/or EU-oriented, while particular (sub-)sectoral interests might push for a
more defensive stance on certain issues15. When looking at anti-dumping
behaviour since the eighties, we see that Belgian companies have participated
in investigations with some regularity – although participation was limited
from 2000 until the onset of the crisis. The iron and steel sector has been the
most active here, accounting for about a third of all cases, followed by the
textile, electrical machinery and fertilizer industries. Several of these sectors
have faced hard times in the past decades and (especially in the case of textiles
and basic metals) have been shedding workers for years16. These are also
sectors in which the EU has faced growing international competition, espe-
cially from the Asian countries that are increasingly targeted by the EU’s
14 According to calculations based on the OECD’s Trade in Value Added database (available online). The
sectors most dependent on foreign inputs for their own exports were producers of transport equipment,
chemicals and metals. In fact, all of Belgian manufacturing was more integrated than the EU average.
15 According to the UN’s Merchandise Trade Correlation Index, Belgium’s most important competitors
(i.e. they export what Belgium exports) are situated within the EU. Belgium’s export profile is most
similar to that of the Netherlands, Spain, Finland and Germany. In recent years, however, there has
been increasing pressure from Asian economies, notably Korea, China, Japan and Singapore
(UNCTADstat, available online).
16 Source: OECD STAN database, available online.
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defensive instruments. On average, however, Belgian interest groups and
policy-makers can be expected to favour both efforts at opening foreign
markets17 while reducing barriers ‘at home’.
Lobby groups
The Belgian position has also been backed by the main interest groups involved
in this policy domain. Specifically, the main business associations in Belgium
have supported free trade in general and have recently been outspoken propo-
nents of the TTIP negotiations. They have also expressed their satisfaction
with the outcome of CETA (VBO-FEB, 2014; 2015; Timmermans et.al.,
2015). These business groups, such as the VBO-FEB, VOKA, Unizo, BECI,
UWE, Boerenbond and UCM, are all part of the Belgian trade policy making
cycle, both institutionalized and informal. Business associations are active
participants of the Inter-ministerial Economic Conferences (IEC), organized
when the European Commission proposes new trade negotiations. At the IEC,
business associations provide input for the Ministry of Economy, which is used
to map both the offensive and defensive interests of the Belgian economy in
upcoming trade negotiations.
Different ministries also take the initiative to consult with business associa-
tions at regular times. This engagement occurs not the least at the regional
level. The Flemish trade administrators, for example, actively cooperates with
the policy unit of VOKA to get a broad picture of Flemish interests (Adri-
aensen, 2014, pp. 116-117). VBO-FEB specifically takes on its lobby role
directly on the European level. Belgian businesses are represented by VBO-
FEB in the European business community through BUSINESSEUROPE.
Moreover, the federation has good contacts in both the European Commission
and the European Parliament. VBO-FEB is also part of the Employers’ Group
in the European Economic and Social Council (VBO-FEB, n.d.).
Whereas Belgium’s pro free trade line has been supported by major busi-
ness, trade unions have been relatively supportive of more liberalization as
well. An analysis of their press releases reveals that trade unions in Belgium
17 Looking at the Merchandise Trade Complementarity Index published by the UN, Belgium has below-
EU-average complementarity (i.e. doesn’t export what they import) as well as lower competition (i.e.
doesn’t export what they export) with recent and potential bilateral FTA partners of the EU. This
indicates that, on aggregate, the stakes were not very high for Belgium – although this is a very crude
measure that doesn’t tell us anything about industry or firm preferences. Moreover, export competition
by (potential) FTA partners such as Korea, Japan and Singapore has been on the rise for several years
(UNCTADstat, available online).
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have traditionally not focused intensively on trade issues within a European
context. More recently, however, they have been taking explicit positions with
regard to the agreements with Colombia, CETA and TTIP. In 2010 there was
a successful campaign by trade unions and NGOs targeted at stopping an
investment agreement between the Belgian-Luxemburg Union and Colombia
because of the latter’s lack of Decent Work (an agenda promoted by the Inter-
national Labour Organisation to promote decent and full employment as well
as social protection and dialogue) (ABVV, 2010). Recently, they have also
formed a united front against CETA and TTIP. Not only do they want these
to be mixed agreements, they are also opposed to the undemocratic nature of
the negotiations and the inclusion of ISDS (Belgisch middenveld, 2015).
Although NGOs are regularly consulted at the European level in a formal-
ized (and institutionalized) way through Civil Society Dialogues, the influence
of these stakeholders on trade policy is not assumed to be very big when
compared to business actors (Dür & De Bièvre, 2007). In Belgium, however,
there is an active NGO community working on trade issues, with Greenpeace
and 11.11.11-CNCD often considered as the leading ‘powers’ – the latter with
a specific expertise in the trade-development nexus. The above-mentioned polit-
icization of TTIP subsequently spurred several new initiatives within this
already fertile Belgian NGO field: D19-20, for example, is a new platform
bringing together several citizen movements, and is now seen as one of the
driving forces of opposition against ‘21st century trade agreements’ in Belgium.
It regularly stages protests in major cities and continues to attract new move-
ments that support their cause. Furthermore, the so-called ‘4 May Coalition’
against TTIP and CETA has also for the first time brought together a wide
range of organisations (going beyond the traditional players such as trade
unions and North-South NGOs) that voice similar concerns regarding modern
trade agreements18. However, it remains to be seen if their efforts in pushing
the politicization of TTIP (and trade policy in general) will result in lasting
changes and/or an increasing impact of civil society.
Institutions and Belgian politics
In addition to the underlying economic structure and the impact of major lobby
groups, there is also an institutional dimension to the Belgian position on EU
18 For the common position, see https://www.acv-online.be/Images/Verklaring-TIPP-middenveld-150430-
tcm183-360704.pdf.
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trade policy. The fragmented nature of the decision-making process19 – across
different ministries as well as policy levels – contributes to the middle ground
position that generally follows that of the European Commission.
The expertise and knowledge that are necessary to develop Belgian posi-
tions on EU trade policy are very fragmented at the administrative level. In
Belgium, participation in EU trade policy is the responsibility of a special unit
within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’20 Directorate-General for European
Affairs and Coordination, called E5. It convenes on a weekly basis on Thurs-
days to prepare Belgian positions on EU trade policy, in anticipation of the
EU’s Trade Policy Committee where Member States’ representatives meet
every Friday to discuss current affairs (e.g. the progress in free trade negotia-
tions). In these coordination meetings, experts from ministerial cabinets and
departments at both the federal and regional level are invited. DG E5 is a
relatively small unit composed of generalist diplomats. Also, the Regions have
only a very small number of administrators that are specifically dedicated to
EU trade policy. They replicate the role of the MoFA DG E5 diplomats on the
regional level, gathering expertise from other departments (for example with
regard to agriculture or cultural services, which are subnational competences)
and coordinating their government’s position on EU trade issues. This limited
and fragmented capacity in trade policy tends to reinforce the Belgian position:
resource constraints do not allow for Belgium to play a deviant role on many
issues. It is more feasible to generally support the Commission’s proposal while
scrutinizing some particular sensitive elements. Especially given the broadening
of the trade agenda, it would be difficult for Belgium to develop specific posi-
tions in each trade-related matter, while it is more practical to focus on some
specific issues such as audiovisual services and agriculture – relying on the
knowhow in the respective ministries. It can be said that trade policy-making
in Belgium is of a rather technocratic nature, since it concerns a limited
number of experts that meet behind closed doors – without much public scru-
tiny. Such an insulated style typically enables a more free trade oriented orien-
tation (Meunier 2005: 8-9).
An obvious additional explanation for the generally balanced nature of
Belgian trade policy positions, is that compromises need to be reached between
19 This is considered as a structural issue in Belgium’s economic diplomacy (see Coolsaet 2014: 539-552).
20 Within the European Union, there is a wide diversity among the Member States with regard to which
ministry is responsible for participation in EU trade policy: this can be the Ministry of Economy, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) or exceptionally a separate Trade Ministry or State Secretariat,
while also other Ministries such as Finance and Agriculture often play a role (see Adriaensen 2014).
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the different regions. Without a consensus among the various regional govern-
ments, Belgium cannot pick sides at the EU level and may be forced to abstain
when trade-issues come to a vote. This has led to a complex series of institu-
tions oriented at producing agreement among (as well as within) the federal
and regional levels (Kersschot, Kerremans, & De Bièvre, 2014). A related
institutional trait is the ‘Grand Coalition’ character of most Belgian govern-
ments where the more liberal (and Flemish) parties can be contented by
supporting the general, liberal orientation of the European Commission while
the more centre-left (and Walloon) parties can be satisfied with protecting the
most sensitive agricultural and services sectors and the promotion of social
standards through trade policy. In Flanders as well as at the federal level, the
Minister (or Secretary of State, trade is either a specific portfolio or part of the
foreign policy responsibility) has almost always been from a liberal party,
while at the Walloon side this position has been held mostly by socialists21.
Conclusions
In this contribution, we have discussed Belgium’s historical and current posi-
tions in the context of the EU’s common external trade policy. We have argued
that this position has been remarkably stable: Belgium has tended to endorse
the European Commission’s trade agenda, supporting it both on procedural/
competence issues as well as in its substantial positions. Belgium is hence an
advocate of progressive liberalisation, while promoting a number of particular
sensitivities (which could be labelled either ‘progressive’ or ‘protectionist’
depending on one’s standpoint) in such fields as audiovisual and public services
or labour rights. This position can be explained by reference to Belgium’s
economic structure, the position of (economic) interest groups and the institu-
tional set-up of Belgian trade policy. The resulting standpoints taken by
Belgium, often coinciding with the European middle ground, has contributed to
a depoliticised context in the trade policy domain.
However, as the EU-US TTIP negotiations are leading to an unseen polit-
icisation of trade policy across Europe, this policy domain is becoming increas-
21 At the federal level trade was dominated by liberals between 1999 and 2014. Although since then the
portfolio has been shared by a Secretary of State for trade (Pieter de Crem, Flemish christian-demo-
crats) and the Minister for Foreign Affairs (Didier Reynders, Walloon liberals), the latter is considered
to be dominating this portfolio in practice. In Flanders, the liberal party held the trade portfolio until
2009, when a christian-democrat took over. Since 2014 the competence has been with Geert Bourgeois
from the Flemish nationalist party. In Wallonia, trade has been always been held by a minister from the
PS, except between 2000-2004 when it was in the hands of a liberal, Serge Kubla.
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ingly contested in Belgium as well. Currently, the historical Belgian practice of
trade policy-making seems untenable for at least three reasons. First, as civil
society criticism is directed at the procedural and substantial position of the
European Commission (which is itself based on a mandate by the Member
States), the debate within Belgium can also no longer be defused by hiding
behind the Commission. Second, this politicisation of EU trade policy is
happening at a historical moment when the Belgian federal level is being
governed by a clear right-wing (and Flemish-dominated) government and the
Walloon and Brussels regional government are of a different composition,
opening space for contestation by left-wing parties at the federal level and
possible regional defection in the ratification phase. Third, and arguably more
fundamentally, TTIP, with its focus on regulatory differences, represents the
tentative apex of the intrusion of trade politics ‘behind-the-border’. This leads
to much stronger ideological differences than more traditional trade agreements,
both between political parties and between business interests and trade unions
and NGOs. Therefore, in the coming years trade policy-making in Belgium is
unlikely to remain as calm, technocratic and consensual as has been the case in
the past.
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